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ABSTRACT
Political scientists generally agree that all individuals structure their cultural 
attitudes in the same unidimensional fashion. However, various populist radical 
right parties remarkably combine moral progressiveness with conservatism 
regarding immigration-related issues. This suggests that the structuring of cultural 
attitudes among the electorate may also be more complex than typically assumed. 
Applying Correlational Class Analysis to representative survey data, the study 
uncovers three cultural belief systems. For individuals adhering to an integrated 
one, all cultural attitudes are interdependent, as typically assumed. However, two 
alternative belief systems are also uncovered: intermediate and partitioned. In the 
latter, positions on one cultural attitude (e.g. ethnocentrism) are barely related to 
positions on others (e.g. rejecting Islam or opposing homosexuality). The existence 
of multiple cultural belief systems challenges the widely held assumption that all 
people organise their cultural attitudes similarly. Both political party agendas and 
individuals’ education level and religion appear key to understanding variation 
in belief systems.
KEYWORDS Belief systems; correlational class analysis; cultural issues; ethnocentrism; political 
attitudes; populist radical right parties; rejection of islam
Political attitudes regarding cultural issues are an important focus in both schol-
arly and popular writing and feature prominently in contemporary political 
debates. Contrary to attitudes pertaining to the economic domain, cultural 
attitudes concern issues of individual freedom and cultural diversity. Economic 
issues differentiate parties and electorates that oppose redistribution from 
those supporting it, and consequently pit the economically strong against the 
economically weak in the so-called ‘democratic class struggle’ (Lipset 1960). 
Cultural issues, alternatively, differentiate parties and electorates that strive 
for individual freedom and embrace cultural diversity from those favouring a 
more rigid and less culturally diverse order.
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In line with Lipset’s (1959, 1960) seminal observations, most scholars agree 
that political attitudes among the public (Achterberg and Houtman 2009; 
Middendorp 1991), as well as the agendas of political parties (Bornschier 2010; 
Lefkofridi et al. 2014), are structured according to these two dimensions: (1) 
redistribution issues, and (2) issues pertaining to cultural order and individual 
liberty. For attitudes on the latter – which are the focus of this study – this 
assumes that among the public a progressive stance on one cultural issue goes 
together with a progressive approach to a broad array of other cultural issues 
(for an overview of five decades of studies reporting such a cultural attitudinal 
dimension, see: Achterberg and Houtman 2009). In Lipset’s day, this cultural 
dimension included ‘civil rights for political dissidents, civil rights for eth-
nic and racial minorities, internationalist foreign policies, and liberal immi-
gration legislation’ (Lipset 1959: 485). Similarly, in his seminal study, Allport 
(1979[1954]: 68) considers prejudice a generalised attitude and argues that 
‘[p]eople who reject one outgroup will tend to reject other outgroups. If a per-
son is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any outgroup’ 
(emphasis added). Also contemporary research considers a conservative stance 
towards ‘people of a different race, people with AIDS, immigrants/foreign work-
ers, homosexuals, people of a different religion, and heavy drinkers’ (Inglehart 
et al. 2008: 269) to be part of one cultural dimension. In short, ‘cultural issues 
are considered interchangeable’ (De Koster and Van der Waal 2007: 452) in 
studies on the ideological profile of citizens of Western countries.
Such a one-dimensional outlook on cultural issues may be applicable to large 
parts of the electorate, but party-level research by Akkerman (2005) and Betz 
and Meret (2009) demonstrates that this is strikingly at odds with the agendas 
of various contemporary populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Western 
Europe. Whereas such parties grew out of resistance against multicultural-
ism and culturally progressive values, these studies show that various Western 
European PRRPs currently combine their well-known culturally conservative 
agenda regarding immigration and ethnic minorities with a culturally progres-
sive approach to gender issues and sexual minorities. Consider for instance the 
Flemish Bloc in Belgium, the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, the Northern 
League in Italy and the List Pim Fortuyn and later on Wilders’ Party for Freedom 
in the Netherlands. ‘Following Fortuyn’s example, they started to portray them-
selves as defenders of liberal values and principles: the separation of church 
and state, freedom of expression and, above all, gender equality and women’s 
rights’ (Betz and Meret 2009: 322; also see Akkerman 2005). This raises a salient 
question about their constituencies: is the well-established conservative stance 
regarding immigration-related issues among supporters of PRRPs (De Koster 
et al. 2014; Rydgren 2008) actually accompanied by a conservative approach to 
other cultural issues, as commonly assumed? We aim to uncover the attitudinal 
configuration of PRRP supporters regarding these issues. To do so, we draw 
on Converse’s (1964) notion of belief systems and apply an analytical approach 
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which, contrary to conventional approaches that impose a singular structure 
of attitudes on every individual in the data, allows us to uncover heterogeneity 
in the ways individuals structure political attitudes.
Belief systems refer to the way individuals understand and structure political 
attitudes. Different belief systems – that is, different configurations of polit-
ical attitudes – may exist among the electorate, but conventional analytical 
approaches ignore this by assuming that all people organise attitudes similarly. 
While extant studies distinguish between economic and cultural issues, they 
assume that all members of the electorate coherently combine either conserva-
tive or progressive stances on various cultural matters. Yet the counter-intuitive 
combination of cultural stances in the agendas of PRRPs suggests that an alter-
native belief system regarding cultural issues may also characterise their constit-
uencies, or parts of them. If so, this has previously gone unnoticed, despite the 
overwhelming attention paid to cultural issues in political science and sociology 
in decades of research. Taking seriously the possibility that different parts of 
the public have different belief systems, we study the ways individual voters 
structure their attitudes on these cultural issues without a priori imposing the 
conventional one-dimensional structure (see Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; 
Goldberg 2011).
We focus on the Netherlands, a strategic case for the issue at hand for two 
reasons. First, it is characterised by a widely observed ‘paradox of tolerance’ 
(Duyvendak 2004): while it is renowned as one of the most progressive coun-
tries regarding gender issues and homosexuality (Inglehart 1997), issues relat-
ing to immigration and ethnic minorities are fiercely debated (Vasta 2007). 
This suggests that at least parts of the electorate do not structure these cultural 
attitudes one-dimensionally. In the political realm, Geert Wilders’ Party for 
Freedom (PVV), which has been represented in the Dutch parliament since 
2006, is an ideal-typical case of a PRRP that combines both progressive and 
conservative cultural stances. It has a conservative agenda regarding immigra-
tion and ethnic minorities and particularly criticises Islam, while it advocates 
progressive stances on issues of gender and sexuality (Betz and Meret 2009; 
Vossen 2011). Second, to our knowledge, there is no other Western European 
country for which representative data are available which include measures of 
all relevant cultural issues. Considering the electoral success of PRRPs with a 
similar agenda as the PVV in various other Western European countries, the 
scholarly implications of our study go beyond the case of the Netherlands.
Theorising the configurations of cultural attitudes among PRRP 
constituencies
One cultural dimension among PRRP supporters?
Unsurprisingly, previous research has assumed that supporters of PRRPs hold 
conservative stances on various cultural issues. This is a reflection of the near 
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consensus in the literature that ‘[p]eople have generalised prejudice levels: those 
who are more prejudiced toward one outgroup tend to be more prejudiced 
toward others’ (Son Hing and Zanna 2010: 163). Nevertheless, two sets of 
research findings challenge this assumption.
First, various PRRPs in Western Europe consistently voice a culturally pro-
gressive agenda concerning gender issues and sexual minorities to support 
their anti-immigrant discourse (Akkerman 2005; Canovan 2005; De Koster 
et al. 2014; Elchardus and Spruyt 2014), and position themselves as ‘defenders 
of fundamental liberal values’ (Betz and Meret 2009: 313). This observation at 
the party level suggests that supporters of PRRPs may not necessarily be con-
servative regarding all cultural issues. If this is not only true for the agendas of 
political parties, but also for the attitudes of the public, it would be strikingly at 
odds with the claims of those like Inglehart and colleagues (2008: 269) that the 
‘acceptance or rejection of homosexuals … [is] a particularly sensitive indicator 
of overall tolerance of outgroups’. Do supporters of PRRPs hold conservative 
attitudes on all cultural issues, as conventional approaches to studying polit-
ical attitudes assume? Or is the complexity at the party level mirrored in the 
attitudes of PRRP constituencies?
Secondly, research suggests that religion and religiously inspired attitudes 
provide the key to understanding why cultural attitudes are not necessarily 
structured in the same way by everyone (see Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014). 
De Koster and Van der Waal (2007), for example, demonstrate that moral con-
servatism, religious orthodoxy and ethnocentrism cannot be lumped together 
as a generalised indicator of cultural conservatism. They suggest that the 
strength of the association between these cultural attitudes varies in the pop-
ulation. Moreover, they show that moral conservatism, which includes conserv-
ative stances on gender roles and homosexuality, is religiously inspired, while 
ethnocentrism is not. Accordingly, conservative stances on one set of cultural 
issues do not necessarily go together with such stances on other cultural issues. 
Consequently, it is possible that, like their party elites, the constituencies of 
PRRPs combine a progressive stance towards homosexuals with a conservative 
stance towards other outgroups like immigrants and ethnic minorities. In trying 
to further our understanding of the specific constellations of cultural attitudes 
among PRRP supporters, we recognise that relations between various cultural 
attitudes may differ systematically between PRRP constituencies on the one 
hand and supporters of other parties on the other. In this regard, we draw on 
Converse’s (1964) notion of belief systems.
Cultural belief systems
Converse (1964: 207) famously conceptualises a belief system as ‘a configura-
tion of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some 
form of constraint or functional interdependence’. Constraints refer to the ways 
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  5
different elements of a belief system – in our case: cultural attitudes – are related 
to one another. That is, whether or not a position on and change in one atti-
tude (e.g. attitudes regarding homosexuals) is associated with positions on and 
changes in other attitudes included in the belief system (e.g. attitudes regarding 
immigrants and ethnic minorities). As Converse stresses, these constraints are 
social in nature and relate to the ways belief systems are created and diffused.
Inspired by Converse’s concept of ‘belief systems’, we use the term ‘cultural 
belief systems’ to refer to the configuration of political attitudes towards cultural 
issues that individuals adhere to. The widely held assumption that different 
cultural attitudes consistently cluster together ensues from the idea that cultural 
belief systems are guided by one latent factor which shapes the various, more 
specific, attitudes. Indeed, it is possible that a single, general orientation guides 
all specific beliefs, generating consistency within a belief system (Moskowitz 
and Jenkins 2004). This encompassing ideology/theme – if there is one – can 
relate to economic, religious, racial, political or social beliefs (Conover and 
Feldman 1984; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004; Olson and Carroll 1992). For 
example, consider Christianity, which can inform conservative stances on var-
ious issues like gender roles, homosexuality, abortion and euthanasia. Due to 
an underlying general Christian orientation, attitudes on these specific issues 
are functionally interdependent (see De Koster and Van der Waal 2007). In a 
similar way, other segments in society may have other general orientations, and 
may therefore experience other constraints on their cultural attitudes and the 
relationships between them. Consequently, different belief systems consisting 
of specific constellations of cultural attitudes may exist among different parts 
of the electorate.
Along with different types of belief system guided by different encompassing 
ideologies or themes, there may be variation in the extent to which cultural belief 
systems are integrated. Converse (1964) suggests that the level of integration of 
a belief system is associated with political competence. Although this seems 
plausible, Achterberg and Houtman (2009) demonstrate that political compe-
tence does not affect the extent of value (in)coherence among Dutch citizens. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Tetlock (1984), who argues – based on 
Putnam’s (1971) interviews with members of the British House of Commons – 
that individuals with ample political competence may adhere to very different 
political belief systems, and that belief systems substantially differ between 
party families. These findings downplay the role of political competence in 
understanding belief systems. Consequently, if PRRP constituencies in the 
Netherlands demonstrate a less integrated cultural belief system, this does not 
imply that a lack of political competence underlies it. Alternative interpretations 
involve processes of framing and agenda-setting of Dutch PRRPs and/or skewed 
media representations of specific cultural issues. After all, research indicates 
that political attitudes and sentiments among the public can be inspired by the 
extent to and the ways in which political parties (Hellwig and Kweon 2016; 
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Minkenberg 2001) and the media (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Van 
Spanje and De Vreese 2014) emphasise specific issues. We argue that such 
mechanisms may not only be true for the contents of political attitudes, but 
also for the ways people structure these attitudes ‒ i.e. for their belief systems.
In order to uncover whether those who prefer Dutch PRRPs have a cultural 
belief system that differs from those of the electorates of other parties, and 
whether and how these different belief systems are at odds with the standard 
assumption that a conservative stance on one cultural issue is accompanied by 
a conservative stance on other cultural issues, we employ a recently developed 
statistical technique: Correlational Class Analysis (CCA) (Boutyline 2016a; 
cf. Goldberg 2011). CCA allows us to uncover segments in the electorate that 
systematically differ in the way they structure their cultural attitudes. In this 
way, our analyses advance the literature by exploring whether there are multi-
ple cultural belief systems viable among the electorate and by scrutinising the 
cultural belief systems of PRRP constituencies.
Potential configurations of the cultural belief systems of PRRP 
constituencies
In order to study cultural belief systems, we consider different cultural issues 
that figure prominently on the political agenda in many Western European 
countries. It is undisputed that issues revolving around immigration are salient 
in contemporary politics (Van der Brug et al. 2015). We therefore study how 
measures of ethnocentrism fit within cultural belief systems. Additionally, we 
include measures of moral progressiveness, namely progressiveness concerning 
gender roles and homosexuality. A progressive stance on these issues is cur-
rently explicitly used by PRRPs in various countries, such as Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands, to defend their anti-immigrant position 
(Akkerman 2005; Betz and Meret 2009). We aim to explore how these issues 
relate to ethnocentrism in the cultural belief systems of PRRP voters.
We also include measures for religious orthodoxy and attitudes towards 
the role of religion in the public domain. This because research strongly sug-
gests that religion plays a pivotal role in the way individuals structure political 
attitudes in general, and ethnocentrism and moral progressiveness in par-
ticular (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; De Koster and Van der Waal 2007; 
Wuthnow 1988). Religious orthodoxy indicates the extent to which one endorses 
Christianity’s central axioms, while acceptance of religion in the public domain 
pertains to the extent to which people accept that religiously inspired behav-
iours are actively conveyed and performed in public life (see Van Bohemen et 
al. 2012). Finally, we include rejection of Islam, which is a measure indicating the 
extent to which individuals regard this religion as problematic. This is relevant 
because issues related to Islam feature prominently in contemporary political 
debates, and a critique of Islam is a key element in the discourse of many 
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PRRPs (Betz and Meret 2009), including in the Netherlands (Akkerman 2005: 
346; De Koster et al. 2014). Moreover, it is unclear, a priori, whether rejection 
of Islam stems from either a progressive rejection of moral conservatism and/
or ethnocentrism (Van Bohemen et al. 2012; cf. Elchardus and Spruyt 2014).
The constellation of these five cultural attitudes may vary, yielding differ-
ent cultural belief systems among different segments of the public. For exam-
ple, religion can result in the justification of both tolerance and intolerance 
towards outgroups (Davis and Robinson 1996). Therefore, religious orthodoxy 
can relate in different ways to progressive attitudes regarding immigrants and 
ethnic minorities.
Our empirical analysis aims to inductively uncover different cultural belief 
systems. Nevertheless, we can tentatively formulate four potential scenarios 
regarding the cultural belief system that may be upheld by PRRP constituencies. 
These cannot be tested statistically, but will aid interpretations of the inductively 
established cultural belief systems. The first scenario assumes a conventionally 
integrated cultural belief system among PRRP constituencies. This would res-
onate with the extant literature that explicitly assumes one-dimensionality of 
cultural attitudes among all segments of the public. Conservatism on one issue 
would go hand-in-hand with conservatism on other issues. This is plausible 
if the often-reported ethnocentrism of PRRP constituencies is embedded in a 
more general orientation. Such a generalised xenophobia – a fear of everything 
that is alien – not only expresses itself in a fear of foreigners, but also, for exam-
ple, in a fear of homosexuals (Ignazi 1992; Mudde 1999). If this is correct, the 
stance towards all cultural attitudes used in the analysis will be intertwined, and 
a position on one of these issues is constrained by the positions on the others.
The second scenario also assumes that there is an integrated cultural belief 
system among PRRP constituencies, but with contrasting elements. This sce-
nario is informed by the observations at the party level discussed above: resem-
bling PRRPs in other Western European countries, PRRPs in the Netherlands 
combine ethnocentrism and a critique of Islam with a strong emphasis on 
gender equality and gay rights (Akkerman 2005; Betz and Meret 2009; De 
Koster et al. 2014). If this also characterises the cultural belief system of their 
constituencies, this would imply a strongly integrated cluster of cultural atti-
tudes, but with negative relationships between ethnocentrism and the rejection 
of Islam on the one hand and moral conservatism, religious orthodoxy and 
acceptance of religion in the public domain on the other.
In the third scenario, ethnocentrism and rejection of Islam are clustered 
together, but are separate from other cultural issues. This reflects the primary 
focus of PRRPs on immigration. In fact, they are often labelled as ‘movements 
of exclusion’ (Rydgren 2005) or ‘anti-immigration parties’ (Van der Brug et al. 
2000), ‘because their common denominator is that the immigration issue is 
their unique selling point’ (Van der Brug and Fennema 2007: 474). While issues 
related to immigration and immigrants seem to be part of a more encompassing, 
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integrated cultural belief system at the party level, their constituencies may not 
display a similarly integrated profile because of the strong emphasis PRRPs put 
on issues related to immigration. In particular, if framing and agenda-setting 
at the party level play a role in shaping the public’s belief systems, the over-
whelming focus on opposing immigration at the party level may lead to this 
third scenario. In addition, the way these issues are depicted by various media – 
part of the so-called ‘tabloidisation of the political discourse’ (Mudde 2013: 
15) – may have a similar effect. Consequently, it is possible that ethnocentrism 
and rejection of Islam are closely intertwined among PRRP constituencies, but 
are not constrained by the positions on other cultural issues.
In the fourth and final scenario, all types of cultural attitude form separate 
clusters. This is inspired by the same reasoning as the third scenario, with the 
main difference being that ethnocentrism is detached from rejection of Islam. 
This scenario resonates with results of a large-scale quantitative content analysis 
of how migration-related issues are portrayed by Dutch media, which demon-
strates ‘that the frame that focuses on Islam as a threat has been dominant 
in the media debate’ (Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007: 535). Furthermore, 
this scenario is in line with the fierce criticism of Islam that has character-
ised Dutch PRRPs since the rise of the late Pim Fortuyn, and has radicalised 
with his political heir Geert Wilders and his PVV. Wilders’ PVV has been the 
most prominent PRRP in the Netherlands since 2006, and is known primar-
ily because it vehemently opposes Islam. Wilders’ accompanying critique of 
progressive elites stems from his assessment that they have enabled a process 
of ‘Islamification’ (Vossen 2010). This strong, enduring emphasis on Islam is 
the theme rather than just a theme for Wilders (Vossen 2013: 105), which 
may lead his supporters to perceive rejection of Islam to be the key cultural 
issue, unconnected to other cultural matters. In fact, some scholars explicitly 
argue that ‘it is hard to classify the PVV as racist or even nativist as Wilders 
has not aimed his barrage at relatively well-integrated ethnic minorities such 
as the Surinamese, Moluccans, Chinese or Indo-Dutch’ (Vossen 2011: 185). If 
a similar cultural belief system characterises Dutch PRRP constituencies, this 
would mean that rejection of Islam is an issue in itself, and is not constrained 
by either ethnocentrism or other cultural issues.
Empirical strategy for uncovering the configurations of the cultural 
belief systems of PRRP constituencies
Following up on the analytical approach of Goldberg (2011) and Baldassarri 
and Goldberg (2014), we uncover different cultural belief systems that exist 
among the Dutch electorate. Subsequently, we study the association between 
voting preferences and socio-demographic indicators on the one hand and 
these belief systems on the other.
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First, we use CCA to uncover different cultural belief systems. CCA is a 
correlational-based extension of Relational Class Analysis (Boutyline 2016a; 
Goldberg 2011). CCA partitions data in different clusters in such a way that the 
members of each cluster have similar patterns of association between variables. 
By applying CCA, we do not cluster individuals with similar cultural attitudes; 
rather, we cluster individuals whose relationships between their cultural atti-
tudes are similar. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Individuals A, B and C (left-
hand panel) all have very different cultural attitudes, but share the same belief 
system because the relationship between their attitudes is similar. Likewise, 
individuals D, E and F (right-hand panel) have different attitudes, but each 
of them shows convergent views regarding women and homosexuals, which 
diverge from their attitudes towards Turks and Moroccans. Indeed, to share a 
belief system ‘does not imply having identical attitudes or behaviors; rather, it 
suggests being in agreement on the structures of relevance and opposition that 
make actions and symbols meaningful’ (Goldberg 2011: 1402).
CCA does not make any a priori assumptions on the constraints charac-
terising belief systems, nor does it impose one belief system on every indi-
vidual in the data. This is where CCA deviates from conventional statistical 
methods. If, for example, we were to apply a factor analysis, we would uncover 
one structure characterised by one or more latent dimensions underlying the 
cultural attitudes. In so doing, factor analysis implicitly imposes one singular 
structure onto the data, assuming that the cultural attitudes of all individuals 
are structured according to these dimensions. CCA, on the other hand, divides 
data into groups of respondents who exhibit distinctive patterns across a set 
of variables. It thus clusters individuals whose attitudes on that set of variables 
are organised in a similar way (Boutyline 2016a; Goldberg 2011). Accordingly, 
CCA is perfectly suited to analysing individuals’ cultural belief systems. Our 
analysis reveals that three distinct cultural belief systems are present among 
the Dutch public.
Second, we study the relationship between preferences for party families and 
socio-demographic indicators, and the different cultural belief systems, with 
specific attention paid to individuals who prefer PRRPs. We reveal a strong 
association between party-family preferences and cultural belief systems. This 
Figure 1. two illustrative belief systems.
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association remains intact when controlling for socio-demographic variables, 
which themselves are also associated with cultural belief systems.
Data and measures
We use data collected by CentERdata in 2012 (Achterberg et al. 2012). This 
research institute maintains a panel of the Dutch population aged 16 and older 
while carefully preserving representativeness. Questionnaires are completed 
online. Respondents lacking internet access were provided with the necessary 
equipment. A sample size of 1302 was obtained with a response rate of 76.3%. 
These data allow us to address our research questions, as they cover an excep-
tionally wide variety of cultural attitudes.
Cultural attitudes. The five cultural attitudes outlined above were measured 
using five sets of five-point Likert items, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to 
‘strongly agree’. We treated ‘don’t know’ answers as missing.1 Listwise deletion 
resulted in 911 respondents being included in the CCA. To aid the interpreta-
bility of the results produced by the CCA – which is a graph-based method – we 
selected several items from well-established scales previously used in the Dutch 
context. The items indicating ethnocentrism are derived from a scale developed 
by Eisinga and Scheepers (1989), which proved reliable in recent research (Van 
Bohemen et al. 2012; De Koster et al. 2014; Van der Waal and De Koster 2015), 
just like scales used for borrowing items for moral progressiveness (De Koster 
et al. 2014; Van Bohemen et al. 2012), religious orthodoxy (De Koster and 
Van der Waal 2007; Immerzeel et al. 2013; Middendorp 1991), acceptance of 
religion in the public domain (De Koster et al. 2014; Van Bohemen et al. 2012), 
and rejection of Islam (Van Bohemen et al. 2012). Figure 2 lists the items used, 
including the labels representing them in the results section.
Party families. We measure party preference using the following question: 
‘Which party would you vote for if parliamentary elections were to be held 
tomorrow?’ To aid the interpretation of our results and comparability with 
previous research in the Netherlands (see De Koster et al. 2014), we catego-
rised the answers into five party families: PRRP (6.5%), old right (18.3%), old 
left (32.9%), new left (21.9%) and Christian (20.4%). We coded PVV and the 
similar Democratisch Politiek Keerpunt / Trots op Nederland as PRRPs. The 
Conservatives (VVD) represent the old right. The new left is represented by 
the Liberal Democrats (D66) and the Greens (GroenLinks). The old left party 
family includes Labour (PvdA) and the Socialists (SP). Finally, the Christian 
category includes the Christian Democrats (CDA), the smaller Christian Union 
(CU) and the Reformed Political Party (SGP).
Socio-demographic characteristics. We include gender, age, education level 
(measured as the number of years formally required to attain one’s highest 
level of education), income (in €1000s) and religious denomination (none; 
Protestant; Catholic; other).
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Results
Three distinct cultural belief systems
The CCA was performed using the corclass package in R (Boutyline 2016b) and 
yields three clusters, respectively representing 43.8%, 23.7% and 32.5% of the 
respondents. Note that looking at the mean scores of the included items (as 
is usually done in other clustering methods) would not help us to understand 
the nature of the clusters. This is because CCA clusters can include individuals 
with very different attitudes (but with the same structuring of these attitudes; 
see Figure 1). We therefore present each cluster’s correlational pattern of the 
included items, which we represent as networks to increase interpretability 
(the correlation matrices are available in the appendix). Nodes correspond 
to cultural attitudes and lines represent the correlations between them. Solid 
lines represent positive correlations and dashed lines negative ones. The width 
and shade of the lines is proportional to the strength of the correlation: wider 
and darker lines represent stronger correlations between the attitudes they 
connect. Only significant correlations are shown (p ≤ 0.05). The visualisations – 
presented in Figure 2 – are obtained using qgraph in R and by applying the 
Fruchterman‒Reingold algorithm (Epskamp et al. 2012).
Taking an overview of the three cultural belief systems, it is clear that their 
differences are particularly related to the position of the items regarding rejec-
tion of Islam and ethnocentrism.
The first cultural belief system uncovered by the CCA can be termed inte-
grated: all cultural attitudes assessed are unified in a consistent, well-integrated 
system, as all the items are strongly correlated with one another. Accordingly, 
there are constraints between all attitudes making up the cultural belief system. 
As conservatively phrased items correlate positively with other conservative 
items and negatively with items indicating cultural progressiveness, this first 
cultural belief system closely matches the current state-of-the-art in the field, 
which suggests that various types of cultural attitude cluster together coherently.
A second cultural belief system clearly adopts an intermediate position 
between the first and third systems, as the attitudes regarding Islam take a 
quasi-isolated position. For those adhering to this cultural belief system, their 
stance vis-à-vis Islam is less constrained by their take on all the other cultural 
issues (compared to those adhering to the integrated belief system). Strikingly, it 
is the cultural issue that is most fiercely debated in both the media and political 
discourse that is least constrained.
The third cultural belief system can be termed partitioned, as it entails three 
isolated sets of cultural attitudes, respectively pertaining to: (1) rejection of 
Islam, (2) ethnocentrism and (3) acceptance of religion in the public domain, 
moral progressiveness and religious orthodoxy. For people characterised by this 
belief system, items measuring the latter set of issues combine in a well-inte-
grated cluster, which is in line with studies utilising conventional methods for 
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determining the structuring of the public’s political attitudes. Yet, contrary to 
the consensus in the literature, for the respondents adhering to this partitioned 
belief system, attitudes to the third set of issues do not constrain their other 
cultural attitudes (or vice versa). Indeed, for these individuals, ethnocentrism 
and stances towards Islam are almost not related. Accordingly, for those adher-
ing to the partitioned belief system (a third of the sample), the widely shared 
assumption that cultural attitudes are interchangeable does not apply.
Having uncovered three distinct cultural belief systems, we assess whether 
these are unevenly distributed across supporters of the five party families, with 
specific attention paid to the PRRP constituencies.
A preference for PRRPs and cultural belief systems
As a first rudimentary step, we present a cross-tabulation of a preference for 
PRRPs on the one hand and the different belief systems on the other (Table 1). 
The association is very strong: 83% of those who prefer PRRPs adhere to the 
partitioned cultural belief system, while only 8.5% of those who prefer PRRPs 
adhere to the integrated version.
Next, we analyse the association between party-family preference and cul-
tural belief systems, taking the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals 
into account. To do this, we run a multinomial logistic regression with cultural 
belief systems as dependent variable. Model 1 in Table 2 includes the effect of 
the party families, while Model 2 also encompasses the socio-demographic 
variables.
Model 1 shows a more nuanced picture of Table 1. Again, it is clear that the 
partitioned belief system is predominantly present among those who prefer 
PRRPs over other party families: all the logit coefficients are positive and sig-
nificant. The integrated belief system is predominantly present among those 
who prefer leftist (both old and new left) political parties: compared to those 
who prefer PRRPs, the odds of having an integrated (rather than a partitioned) 
belief system are 60.8 (e4.107) times higher for those who prefer new-leftist par-
ties and 24.9 (e3.216) times higher for those who prefer old-leftist parties. The 
differences between those who prefer PRRPs and those who prefer old-rightist 
and Christian parties are smaller, but still substantial ‒ i.e. the odds of having an 
integrated (rather than a partitioned) belief system are 5.8 (e1.766) times higher 
Table 1. cross-tabulation prrp preference and cultural belief systems (row percentages).
pearson chi²: 58.5585 (df = 2); p < 0.001.
aall non-prrp parties combined.
Cultural belief system
Integrated Intermediate Partitioned
prrp preference 8.5% 8.5% 83.0%
preference for other partya 46.2% 24.7% 29.0%
total 43.8% 23.7% 32.5%
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for those who prefer old-rightist parties and 4.9 (e1.584) times higher for those 
who prefer Christian parties, as compared to those who prefer PRRPs.
The results of Model 2 clearly show that the association between party-family 
preference and cultural belief systems is not confounded by the socio-demo-
graphic profile of the party-family constituencies: the coefficients of the party 
families hardly change when socio-demographics are added to the model. The 
high proportion of those adhering to a partitioned cultural belief system who 
prefer PRRPs over other party families is thus not the result of, for example, a 
lower level of education or male gender.
Focusing on the importance of socio-demographics for understanding the 
social bases of the three cultural belief systems, we see clear differences between 
the integrated and partitioned cultural belief systems in terms of education 
level. More highly educated individuals more often uphold an integrated belief 
system instead of a partitioned one: for every additional year of education, the 
odds of having an integrated cultural belief system instead of a partitioned one 
increase by 1.21 (e0.188). Moreover, Protestants and Catholics have lower odds 
of having an integrated instead of a partitioned cultural belief system than 
those not belonging to a religious denomination (respectively, e‒0.947 = 0.39 
and e‒0.994 = 0.37). Finally, adherence to belief systems is not associated with 
income, age and gender.
Discussion
Cultural belief systems prove to be very strongly related to party-family pref-
erences. Our finding that a large majority of those who prefer PRRPs have a 
Table 2. Multinomial logistic regression on the cultural belief systems: logit coefficients.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (n = 726).









Intercept −2.277*** −2.277*** −5.339*** −1.681
party family
prrp  –  –  –  – 
 old right 1.766** 1.073 1.646** 0.923
 new left 4.107*** 3.028*** 4.025*** 2.796***
 old left 3.216*** 2.138*** 3.335*** 2.041***
 christian 1.584** 2.411*** 2.172*** 2.017***
education  –  – 0.188*** −0.001
income  –  – 0.149 0.085
age  –  – 0.005 −0.007
Gender (female)  –  – −0.206 0.368
religion
 none  –  –  –  – 
 protestant  –  – −0.947** 0.824
 catholic  –  – −0.994*** 0.561
 other  –  – −0.656 0.897
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partitioned belief system, seems indicative of the influence political parties have 
on the electorate. This because the reverse causality seems highly unlikely: it is 
implausible that individuals develop party preferences as a result of a certain 
belief system. Individuals are likely to vote for specific parties because their 
attitudinal positions match party agendas, not because the structuring of their 
attitudes resembles that of parties. Given our results, we posit that the agen-
da-setting of the political party individuals prefer influences their cultural belief 
system. Our findings resonate with the fourth scenario developed in the theory, 
which stresses the importance of framing and agenda-setting by political parties 
and the media: rejection of Islam in particular is less (intermediate cultural 
belief system), or scarcely to not at all (partitioned one), constrained by other 
cultural attitudes. In the case of a partitioned belief system, a close connection 
between rejection of Islam and ethnocentrism is even absent.
More specifically, the finding that rejection of Islam plays a pivotal role in 
discerning the integrated cultural belief system from the partitioned one aligns 
with suggestions that PRRPs can weigh on the political field, even if they are 
located in the opposition (Han 2015; Minkenberg 2001; Mudde 2013). That is, 
PRRPs may succeed in imposing a certain logic which dictates the salience of 
issues regarding Islam. If this underlies the constellation of the intermediate 
and partitioned cultural belief systems, this stresses the agenda-setting abil-
ities of PRRPs, despite their relatively modest electoral success (see Jackman 
and Volpert 1996: 502–503). After all, not only the large majority of the PRRP 
electorate, but also 29% of the individuals who reported a preference for a 
non-PRRP adhere to a partitioned belief system. In addition, the intermediate 
cultural belief system – which is not strongly associated with a preference for 
PRRPs – is also characterised by a non-conventional take on issues of Islam. 
This resonates with issue-competition theory which stresses that political par-
ties emphasise issues to make them dominant in electoral competition and to 
force other parties to address these issues (Carmines and Stimson 1993).
The tabloidisation of political discourse (Mudde 2013: 15) provides an 
additional interpretation of the pivotal role of stances towards Islam in dis-
cerning the three cultural belief systems and their unequal distribution over 
party-family constituencies. While criticism of Islam is not the sole element 
of the political agenda of PRRPs, Geert Wilders’ fiercely voiced critique may 
be exceptionally visible to the public because of the media attention paid to 
it. This is not only because the theme features prominently in Wilders’ own 
media messages (De Landtsheer et al. 2011), but also because Dutch media in 
general overwhelmingly focus on Islam when reporting on issues of migration 
and integration (Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007). This may explain why 
attitudes towards Islam have a remarkably isolated position in the partitioned 
cultural belief system, not even closely connected to ethnocentrism. In addi-
tion, it may ensue from the fact that a one-sided focus on Islam as a threat is 
most prominent among popular media (Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007), 
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which are preferred by supporters of PRRPs (Bos et al. 2014). Future research 
is needed to study whether, and how, media representations of political issues 
and patterns of media consumption account for the unequal distribution of 
cultural belief systems over different parts of the electorate.
Next to the possible influence of political parties and media representations, 
other factors contribute to variation in belief systems. Especially education and 
religion – rather than the structural factors of income, age and gender – appear 
to be influential. The role of education for belief systems suggests that Converse’s 
(1964) idea that political competence results in more integrated belief systems 
might be valid. Our analysis does indeed show that a higher level of education, 
which is closely related to political competence (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), 
is associated with adhering to an integrated cultural belief system.2
The finding that an encompassing Christian worldview does not inspire an 
integrated cultural belief system might seem counter-intuitive. Yet the specific 
constellation of the partitioned cultural belief system provides an interpreta-
tion. Note that issues sanctified by Christianity – moral conservatism, religious 
orthodoxy and acceptance of religion in the public domain – are integrated 
within a sub-cluster in the partitioned cultural belief system, but do not con-
strain ethnocentrism and rejection of Islam. Such a constellation of cultural 
attitudes among Catholics and Protestants might indicate ambivalence towards 
Islam (Wiegers 2012). One the one hand, similar dogmas and institutional 
accommodation of religious minorities make Christians and Muslims political 
allies. On the other hand, many, especially orthodox, Christians regard Islam 
as ‘alien to the Netherlands and the Western culture’ (Wiegers 2012: 25). These 
cross-pressuring factors may account for the greater affinity with the partitioned 
belief system (instead of the integrated one) among Christians. However, more 
research is needed to increase our understanding of the exact mechanisms 
through which religion influences cultural belief systems.
Conclusion
We studied the structuring of cultural attitudes among the Dutch public, with 
special attention paid to those who prefer PRRPs. We applied a novel analytical 
approach, which recognises heterogeneity in the ways individuals understand 
and organise their cultural attitudes (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Boutyline 
2016a; Goldberg 2011). Our analyses inductively uncovered three ‘cultural 
belief systems’ – i.e. specific constellations of political attitudes towards cultural 
issues – among the Dutch public: ‘integrated’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘partitioned’.
The integrated cultural belief system is in line with findings based on con-
ventional methods, like factor analysis, which impose a similar structuring 
of cultural attitudes on all research subjects. More conservative views on a 
specific cultural issue go together with more conservative stances on other 
cultural issues. Accordingly, in the integrated cultural belief system, individuals 
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consider the different cultural issues to be logically connected and composing 
a unity. In contrast, for those with a partitioned cultural belief system, the 
cultural dimension clearly does not represent a coherent monolithic entity. 
This remarkable phenomenon was hidden from view by previous studies on 
the structuring of political attitudes. Because a substantial share of individuals 
adheres to an integrated belief system, conventional analyses mask differences 
in the degree to which individuals’ belief systems are integrated.
This finding informs the debate regarding electoral competition in the cul-
tural domain. Does this revolve around single issues (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2007) 
or around a coherent cultural dimension (e.g. Kitschelt 1995)? Our results 
indicate that both views are, to some extent, correct: whereas PRRP supporters 
in the Netherlands exhibit a partitioned cultural belief system reflecting the 
issue-competition approach, other, especially leftist, electorates have an inte-
grated cultural belief system reflecting the dimensional interpretation. This 
integrated belief system resonates with the way cultural issues are constrained 
in most party agendas: in the political agendas of non-PRRPs, progressiveness 
(conservatism) on one of those issues is typically accompanied by progressive-
ness (conservatism) on the others (Lefkofridi et al. 2014).
Overall, inspired by Baldassarri and Goldberg’s (2014) work on the American 
electorate, our findings on the Dutch context highlight the vital importance 
of acknowledging the existence of different belief systems in contemporary 
politics. More specifically, our study evidences that two out of three cultural 
belief systems strongly deviate from the one-dimensional structuring of cul-
tural attitudes that has conventionally been assumed in decades of research 
(Achterberg and Houtman 2009) and in which ‘cultural issues are considered 
interchangeable’ (De Koster and Van der Waal 2007: 452). We focused on the 
Dutch case because it is theoretically salient (given a PRRP agenda that com-
bines conservative and progressive cultural stances) and empirically feasible 
(given available data on a wide range of relevant cultural attitudes). We hope 
that our findings inspire studies in other countries when suitable data become 
available. This would enable the uncovering of variation in cultural belief sys-
tems in countries with and without PRRPs in parliament, and cross-national 
comparisons would aid uncovering the generative mechanisms behind them. 
The role of PRRP agendas and media representations of Islam for inspiring 
non-conventional cultural belief systems could, for instance, be more sys-
tematically scrutinised. More generally, we are convinced that future research 
should strive to achieve a more in-depth understanding of the ways individuals 
perceive, understand and structure political issues, in addition to the common 
focus on the causes and consequences of people’s positions on these issues. We 
hope this article serves as an impetus to study the development, distribution, 
backgrounds and implications of belief systems in political research.
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Notes
1.  We refrain from using imputation, as this is fundamentally at variance with the 
relational nature of CCA by assigning individuals scores based on aggregate 
statistics (see Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014). Additionally, four respondents 
were removed from the analysis as they completed the survey in less than 10 
minutes.
2.  An alternative interpretation of the finding that less educated individuals are 
more likely to adhere to a partitioned belief system is that they perceive issues 
regarding ethnocentrism as economic rather than cultural issues. However, 
this idea is not corroborated by empirical research (Hainmueller and Hopkins 
2014; Van der Waal and De Koster 2015). Re-estimating the models in Table 2 
is also at odds with this alternative interpretation: including a measure for job 
insecurity proves that labour market position is unrelated to belief systems.
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